Every Friday, we look ahead at three developments worth watching, and we attach odds we’ll score in public.

1. Russia is testing the fence

The drones and missiles crossing into NATO territory are no longer rare accidents. They follow a pattern. Russia violated the airspace of NATO members 18 times in 2025 alone, using drones, aircraft and missiles. The turning point came last September, when at least 19 Russian drones entered Polish airspace and NATO jets shot several down. NATO answered with Eastern Sentry, a reinforced air-defense mission along its eastern flank.

2026 has escalated further. A cruise missile crashed into Polish territory on July 29, about 50 kilometers from the city of Lublin. Romania carried out its first-ever drone interception in July, followed quickly by two more. In August, NATO allies said the incidents demonstrate Russia’s increasing tolerance for risk.

Poland’s foreign intelligence chief put the logic plainly. Russia is systematically crossing red lines to test NATO’s response, the costs of these provocations are low, and because the alliance responds mainly with political measures, it invites further escalation. Every incident tells Moscow something: how fast NATO reacts, how hard, and how united. Russian officials have denied responsibility for all such incursions.

2. The “rescue mission” scenario

The next test may not be a drone. According to The Telegraph, the U.S. has warned Warsaw that Russia is planning an armed provocation in Poland, which could include missile and drone strikes or even a limited ground incursion. It also reported how such a move might be disguised: as an accidental straying into Polish territory blamed on a GPS failure, or as a fabricated “rescue mission” to retrieve a malfunctioning helicopter.

Picture it. A Russian helicopter “goes down” just inside Poland. Russian personnel cross the border to recover the crew. Polish forces arrive, and two militaries face each other on NATO soil. Security officials believe any ground operation could originate from Kaliningrad, Russia’s heavily armed exclave on Poland’s border, or from Belarus.

The goal would not be territory. Moscow could expect Poland to hold back from using force and instead be pressured by allies, particularly the United States, to negotiate rather than respond militarily. A standoff that ends in talks would show the world that NATO’s Article 5 guarantee can be negotiated down.

The eastern flank is taking this seriously. Poland’s defense minister has warned that Russia captured a large number of Ukrainian drones and may use them against NATO or to stage a false-flag attack. Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are working together to shield their infrastructure from attacks that could be staged as false-flag operations. Officials say the biggest danger is not the physical damage but the political chaos it could cause at NATO headquarters while Europe and the United States debate how to respond, and whether they should.

What to watch: Belarusian or Russian exercises near the Polish border, spikes in GPS jamming, and Moscow publicly accusing Kyiv or Warsaw of plotting a false flag. Accusing the other side first is a classic way to prepare the ground.

3. The information war now runs on AI

The third front is aimed at you. In 2026, according to researchers, Russia built a three-layer AI influence architecture: the Storm-1516 network aimed at ordinary users; the Matryoshka bot farm, which disguises fakes as stories from well-known outlets and targets fact-checkers; and the Pravda network, a web of propaganda sites aimed at search algorithms.

The output is growing. Bloomberg found that Storm-1516 narratives more than doubled in the first quarter of 2026 compared with a year earlier. More than 40% aimed to undermine support for Ukraine, and many are presented by people pretending to be whistleblowers or investigative journalists.

The newest tactic targets AI itself. The Pravda network churned out 3.6 million articles in 2024 across roughly 150 domains, and a NewsGuard study of 10 leading chatbots found they repeated its falsehoods more than 33% of the time. Researchers call this “LLM grooming.” In April, the Atlantic Council’s DFRLab published early evidence of this propaganda in AI training data, not just in live search results.

China plays a quieter game. Rather than inventing new grievances, its operators amplify existing American ones, creating fake local voices designed to look authentic. In June, OpenAI identified two clusters of ChatGPT users likely originating from China generating content for covert influence operations, including claims that data center build-outs are raising electricity costs for the average American family. Leaked documents from the Chinese firm GoLaxy revealed profiles of 117 U.S. members of Congress and more than 2,000 political figures, making it possible to tailor propaganda to specific people. And The New York Times found that Iran and China have used AI agents in novel social media influence campaigns.

With the midterms on November 3, this matters now. Influence operations are getting harder to detect, but directly interfering with voting systems remains difficult, because U.S. electoral systems are diverse and security investments since 2018 have steadily fixed vulnerabilities. The realistic threat is not to the vote count. It is to how you feel about your neighbors, and whether you believe anything at all.

How to protect yourself: Be wary of a “whistleblower” or “journalist” you have never heard of, a local news site with no track record, and any post perfectly engineered to make you furious. Check before you share. That includes AI answers. The AI tools we use can be groomed too, which is exactly why we verify every source.

Our calls

1. Another confirmed Russian drone or missile incursion into Polish airspace by December 31, 2026. 85%
2. Russian or Belarusian military personnel cross onto NATO territory in a declared rescue or recovery operation by March 31, 2027. 10%
3. Before November 3, 2026, a U.S. government agency or a major tech company publicly attributes an AI-assisted Russian or Chinese influence operation targeting the midterms. 70%

Question everything. Including us.

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Sources

• Wikipedia: Öresund drone incident (2025 NATO airspace violation count)
• RFE/RL: Allies rally to Poland’s defense after Russian drones violate airspace (Sept. 2025)
• Novaya Gazeta Europe: NATO announces Eastern Sentry (Sept. 2025)
• Euronews: NATO stands with Poland and Romania amid Russian airspace violations (Aug. 2026)
• NATO: Allies condemn recent airspace violations and incidents (Aug. 2026)
• ABC News: Russia’s strikes increasingly spilling into NATO, Romania says (Aug. 2026)
• dpa via GNA: Poland warns of risk of Russian incursions on NATO’s eastern flank (June 2026)
• NV: Russia planning provocation or limited ground incursion in Poland, U.S. warns (citing The Telegraph, July 2026)
• UNITED24: US warns Warsaw of potential Russian armed provocation (July 2026)
• Defense News: Russia may use captured Ukrainian drones against Poland and Baltics (July 2026)
• Ukrainska Pravda: Poland and Baltic states preparing for possible false-flag strike, citing Reuters (Aug. 2026)
• UNN: Poland and Baltics strengthen infrastructure protection, citing Reuters (Aug. 2026)
• Interfax-Ukraine: Russia intensified disinformation via AI in 2026 (May 2026)
• Bloomberg: Russia’s disinformation war floods social media (Apr. 2026)
• France 24: Russian disinformation “infects” AI chatbots (Mar. 2025)
• UNITED24: AI tools repeat propaganda from the Pravda network (Mar. 2025)
• DFRLab: Pravda in the pipeline (Apr. 2026)
• The Hill: China’s shifting tactic, amplifying US divides over AI infrastructure (Aug. 2026)
• Benton Institute: OpenAI says China launched influence campaign on AI data centers (June 2026)
• Under-Reported China: The era of AI-driven operations has arrived (GoLaxy documents)
• TNND: How AI agents can run foreign influence campaigns (Sept. 2026)
• Brennan Center: Threat of foreign influence on U.S. elections remains as federal defenses recede (July 2026)